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One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis | 
 enlarge | Authors: Aleksandr Fursenko, Timothy J. Naftali
Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company
Category: Book
List Price: $18.95
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Rating:  26 reviews
Sales Rank: 57578
Media: Paperback
Pages: 448
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.5
Dimensions (in): 9.2 x 6.1 x 1.2
ISBN: 0393317900
Dewey Decimal Number: 973.92
EAN: 9780393317909
ASIN: 0393317900
Publication Date: August 1998
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Amazon.com Review
The Berlin Wall has been rubble for a decade and the memories of the cold war are growing dim. And yet no one is ever likely to forget the Cuban Missile crisis of October 1962, when the world stood on the brink of full-scale nuclear war as the Soviet Union and America locked horns off the coast of Florida. The Soviet navy set sail for Cuba loaded with nuclear warheads for their newly constructed missile bases, precipitating the crisis. After 10 days of high tension, the Soviet Union backed down and the warheads were sent back home. War was averted, but up until now, no one has ever been too certain just how close the world came to catastrophe. Kennedy was assassinated long before he could write his memoirs, Castro's lips are sealed, and the Soviet archives were a closed book. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali have taken advantage of recent unrestricted access to Soviet records and performed painstaking detective work to fill the gaps in the historical record. Some of the tension of the narrative is lost, because we know the outcome; even so, they give penetrating insights as they reconstruct the drama step by step. We learn that the Kremlin did seriously consider launching a nuclear attack on the U.S.: the appropriate orders were discussed and Khrushchev spent the night of October 22 in his office so he could be on hand to cable his authorization. Some of the most interesting facts to emerge, however, are those concerning John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert. JFK had always previously been portrayed as something of a parochial gung-ho type, but this, it emerges, was merely a public persona designed to appease the Pentagon hawks. At the same time JFK was talking about a Cuban invasion, he and his brother were engaging in a more secret policy of appeasement through the Soviet ambassador. Fortunately for all of us, diplomacy won the day. In recent years, JFK has been somewhat discredited as a leader for his unpleasant sexual carryings-on and corruption. It may just be that this view is as incomplete as his portrayal as the saintly "King of Camelot". If so, One Hell of a Gamble could be the first stage in his partial rehabilitation. --John Crace, Amazon.co.uk
Product Description
Based on classified Soviet archives, including the files of Nikita Khrushchev and the KGB, "One Hell of a Gamble" offers a riveting play-by-play history of the Cuban missile crisis from American and Soviet perspectives simultaneously. No other book offers this inside look at the strategies of the Soviet leadership. John F. Kennedy did not live to write his memoirs; Fidel Castro will not reveal what he knows; and the records of the Soviet Union have long been sealed from public view: Of the most frightening episode of the Cold War--the Cuban Missile Crisis--we have had an incomplete picture. When did Castro embrace the Soviet Union? What proposals were put before the Kremlin through Kennedy's back-channel diplomacy? How close did we come to nuclear war? These questions have now been answered for the first time. This important and controversial book draws the missing half of the story from secret Soviet archives revealed exclusively by the authors, including the files of Nikita Khrushchev and his leadership circle. Contained in these remarkable documents are the details of over forty secret meetings between Robert Kennedy and his Soviet contact, records of Castro's first solicitation of Soviet favor, and the plans, suspicions, and strategies of Khrushchev. This unique research opportunity has allowed the authors to tell the complete, fascinating, and terrifying story of the most dangerous days of the last half-century.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 21 more reviews...
 Finally....A Book Worth Reading on the Cuban Missile Crisis August 11, 2008
Dr. R. E. Sullivan (Goliad, Republic of Texas)
One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis I was a member of the National Battle Staff during this Crisis. As such I was present in the Alternate Military Command Center for some six days while the politicians in the US and Russia worked out a settlement. For the first time that I'm aware of this book makes it known that even the casual handler of classified material in Washington at the time knew that the Russians were moving missiles into Cuba. This had been expected, since our MRBMs in Italy and Turkey were a constant threat to the Russians, and their complaints had been loud and frequent. Thus, when intelligence channels began to pick up reports from largely previously untested US agents recently infiltrated into Cuba there was initially a tendency to downplay these. However when these reports began to proliferate from many place in Cuba, and the descriptions of the loads on the trucks jibed, there could no longer be a question as to what they were and who had moved them in. For that reason Kennedy's rather rabid reaction surprised the hell out of those of us who had watched the emplacement of Russian missiles over the past several months. (My memory says that I first read of this subject in late May of '62, but I couldn't swear to that. If not May then it was very soon thereafter.) Unfortunately some of the reviews talk about the "War Hawks" in the Pentagon. Those "War Hawks" knew more than anyone else on earth at the time of the effects of a nuclear exchange with Russia. At the same time they were charged with conducting a successful exchange (should there be such a thing) while the duty of the politicians was to see that the situation did not deteriorate to that degree. As the days went by after the first alert and the launching of our bomber force, it became apparent that the US, and presumably Russia, were faced with a deteriorating situation where the longer the crisis continued the requirement to bring down bombers and crew for required systems maintenance and crew rest/exchange was a factoid that had to be reckoned and dealt with accordingly. This is what the JCS were attempting in every way they knew how to get across to their political superiors. If those JCS voices sound shrill in retrospect it is only because they were exercising their sworn duty. Believe me, those of us who had the most knowledge of nuclear weapons and their effects were happier than anyone else when the crisis was resolved without their use. As was quoted at the time, none of us knew for sure what weapons would be unveiled for WW III. But we knew that WW IV was going to be fought with sticks and stones.
 Making the world safe for Fidel July 2, 2008
Phoebus Franca (San Francisco Bay Area, CA USA)
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
This is a pretty essential book for understanding the Crisis as well as the Cold War and a real turning point in it. The authors do a great job of describing, based on research in the archives, how the Soviet - Cuban relationship evolved. The US moves are told in less detailed fashion, which makes this a good companion to the Beschloss' book The Crisis Years, which tells the Kennedy/US side in great detail. What makes this book a great experience is hearing the tale told more from the Soviet point of view.
Fortunately for the world, the instinctive decision making of both Kennedy and Khrushchev were wise enough to avoid a war in the end. While on both sides, particularly the American side, there were militarists arguing for warfare, invasion, nuking and all that, the two leaders never lost control of their governments or their collaboration on resolving it short of war. For both, it was probably their finest hour.
The telling of the "13 days" of the crisis is a little flat in this book, oddly enough. What is more exciting is the whole lengthy build up to that crisis point. The "gamble" was being played by both sides, but Khrushchev's gamble of putting nukes on Cuba and creating a satellite out of that country and its often uncontrollably nationalistic leader was far greater than what Kennedy was trying to do. One could argue that the US could have taken out Castro and gotten away with it up until Bay of Pigs; after that, the stakes increasingly became too high.
You see through this book the kind of pressure Khrushchev's style of world communist leadership was putting on the West. Yet, Castro tested just how aggressive Khrushchev was willing to be. By 1960, the Soviet Revolutionaries were getting on in years and were no longer so impetuous and daring. They wanted a little safer Mano a Mano with the US. Castro doesn't do very well in this book, although he was kind of taken advantage of by the Soviets. Still, at the height of the crisis, he was the one egging on the Soviets to pull the trigger and nuke the Yanquis. Fortunately, Castro's behavior not only did not sway Khrushchev but also convinced him that the nukes should not stay in Cuba in part because he could not trust Castro's judgment.
The irony is that in a sense, Castro got what he wanted: a guarantee that the US would not invade Cuba. Khrushchev's gamble and negotiating made it safe for his regime to continue, which it has done for nearly half a century.
 Missing one crucial fact, mentioned in textbooks December 16, 2007
Gregory R. Baines (Shanghai PRC)
0 out of 1 found this review helpful
This book is a very well researched book. It looks at the issues form various points of view, and it's well worth picking up to add to a collection of texts on this period.
However (please correct me if Im wrong), this bookk misses one crucial chapter in the crisis that is curcial to understaing the background to this crisis, and is mentioned in a text book I use to teach this subject. Castro went to the US very early on, seeking US aid and to explian his nationalisation plans. He was quite reasonable- he offered to pay off the companies he took over, and wanted to negotiate, but the US refused. This left him no choice but to lean toward the USSR.
Why is this missing from this text???
Most Detailed account of Cuban-Missile Crisis October 16, 2006
Roy E. Cloudburst (USA)
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Two Harvard scholars, Russian Historian Aleksandr Fursenko and American Historian Timothy Nafatali expose the missing gaps to one of the Cold War's most pivotal episodes - the Cuban Missile Crisis. In their 1998 book One Hell of a Gamble, they convincingly argue that the Post-WWII episode was an international dilemma. Contending that "no one person or government created the mix of interest, power, and fear that nearly exploded in 1962," the authors develop a sound narrative that illuminates the finer details of the crisis. They succeed marvelously, with minor exceptions, at explaining the Soviet and American nuances of the dramatic history involved in the early 60's. Beginning with the rise of revolutionary leader Fidel Castro and ending with Khrushchev's demise, the work chronicles the delicate balance of power that tilted back and forth between the superpowers and Cuba.
The authors masterfully handle Soviet archives, and American sources, but the authors somewhat clumsily rifle through Cuban historiography. The opening chapters, however, do correctly portray Castro's budding relationship with the Soviet Union, and his diminishing alliance with the United States. And the failed Bay of Pigs operation coupled with Kennedy's campaign promise to "not be soft" on Cuba, did indeed solidify Castro's motivation to ally with the Soviets. In contrast, one of the chief frailties of the work lies with the somewhat unclear portrayal of Castro's image and relationship with key confidants. Granted, the authors lacked access to Cuban archives, but the absence of corroboration leaves room for question. For instance, the authors portray Castro as having a "privileged background" in his early years and offer little evidence to substantiate this claim. This description of Castro, however, contradicts most scholarship on the dictator's earlier years. Ernesto Betancourt, Washington Representative to Castro in the late 50's, noted that Castro was "one of the illegitimate children of the house servant sired by his father." Betancourt further noted that Castro was embarrassed about his childhood and disillusioned by not being allowed to utilize the "facilities established for American staffers at the United Fruit Club." The club, which in part was established by the profits of his father's sugar plantation, created a wedge of indifference between the young Castro and the Americans. According to Betancourt, the aforementioned facts led to the complex that feeds Castro's "inferiority against the Cuban upper classes . . . [and] . . . the United States in general." The author's portrayal of Castro's image as a young man was incomplete and somewhat misleading. With a minor lapse in scholarship, the authors quickly change academic gears and advance a sound narrative on the Soviet historiography of the crisis.
Utilizing a trove of recently accessible Soviet archives, the Harvard scholars introduce new behind- the- scene details of how the crisis unfolded. The Soviets, of course, capitalized on America's failed overthrow of Cuba. Khrushchev estimated that the deployment of nuclear warheads ninety miles from America's coastline would tip the strategic nuclear balance in the Soviet's favor and would support the Cuban revolution. Moreover, he projected that the deployment of warheads could be kept secret until it was too late for the U.S. to act. This, of course, was an error in judgment - as U-2 reconnaissance planes quickly determined the presence of missiles in Cuba. Formerly, scholars ascribed to the belief that hard-liners in the Kremlin forced, or highly encouraged, Khrushchev to place Soviet warheads on the island nation. However, the evidence presented by the authors discounts this premise - and strongly suggests that Khrushchev's acted alone in this decision.
After the American discovery of warheads in Cuba in October of 1962, the two superpowers engaged in active diplomatic negotiations. In previous histories of the crisis, it was thought that only official and public channels were utilized for communications between the countries. Utilizing a partially transcribed collection of the Kennedy ExCom (Executive Committee) tapes, we learn for the first time about a small network of back channel communications - which proved to be vital in the continuing negotiations for peaceful resolution to the crisis. For instance, Aleksandr Alekseev, the Soviet Ambassador to Havana, provided an informal communication channel between the Cubans and Soviets. Similarly, Georgi Bolshakov a Soviet Intelligence officer, relayed messages between the Soviets and Americans via Robert Kennedy and American journalist Frank Holeman.
Ironically, the authors reveal that Kennedy provided private concessions to the Kremlin via Bolshakov during the critical thirteen days of the crisis. Most importantly, Kennedy agreed to remove the American Jupiter missiles from Turkey - a revelation that was not publicized to the media.
Interestingly, only bilateral sources, namely known intelligence officers and journalists, were noted in this work. The authors, however, fail to mention the GRU spy, Oleg Penkovsky, who allegedly provided the CIA with detailed information on the Soviet missile capabilities and locations at the time. In The Spy Who Saved the World, Penkovsky was given credit for relaying crucial intelligence reports to the Kennedy Administration, which allegedly contributed to his decision for a quarantine of the Soviet naval fleet. It remains unclear why Fursenko and Naftali omitted this fact; perhaps they had no detailed evidence that the U.S had legitimate clandestine sources. Of course, de-classified intelligence archives from both the CIA and KGB may have been sanitized; and therefore, may have limited the author's ability to understand and synthesize intelligence sources. Whatever the case, the Penkovsky exclusion limits the intelligence scholarship of the missile crisis. One question the authors may have raised, was whether Kennedy fully utilized intelligence provided by unilateral human sources, such as Penkovsky, during the crisis?
Thankfully for mankind, the careful deliberations between Kennedy and Khrushchev resulted in a peaceful compromise that averted a thermo-nuclear war. The authors concluded that after the missile crisis "Khrushchev and Kennedy were now willing to take risks for better relations." Their efforts established a detente between the two superpowers - but one that was brief. Unfortunately, the short-lived prospect faded after the November 1963 Kennedy assassination and the October 1964 coup that removed Khrushchev from power.
One hell of a Gamble is a tremendously detailed work that exceeds previous scholarship on the post-WWII crisis. The authors offer compelling evidence that the crisis came closer to spinning out of control than once thought. We discover that Castro, Khrushchev, and Kennedy were "ultimately driven by a sense of what was best for themselves, and for their people." Moreover, the authors convincingly demonstrate that Cuba became the pivotal pawn in the Cold War chess match between the Soviets and the Americans. So persuasive was their story, that film director Ronald Donaldson used the context of their work for the film Thirteen Days - which depicted the crucial two weeks of the missile crises. Although an unexceptional account of the crisis on the American and Cuban fronts, the authors do offer an authoritative interpretation on Soviet historiography during the 1962 crisis. Cold War scholars should pay careful attention to this work, which highlights some of the missing details of an especially tense period during the Cold War.
The Cuban Missile Crisis' Origins, Events, and Decisions September 19, 2005
George Coppedge (Czech Republic)
5 out of 6 found this review helpful
In 1958, Fidel Castro and his band of guerillas successfully overthrew the despised Batista regime in Cuba. At the time, Castro was a question mark for US policymakers. He actually was invited to visit the US and gave a speech at Harvard. However, his domestic socialist reforms caused consternation in Washington, while the communist affiliations of his leading supporters (e.g. his brother, Raul, and Che Guevara) created outright alarm. The authors infer that in 1958 Castro could have gone either way, i.e. communist or non-communist. However, Washington's thinly veiled distrust and eventual outright hostility against him supposedly pushed him into seeking Soviet support.
The book then continues, following Castro's ascension to power, his increasing fear of US-backed invasion, and his greater and greater demands for increased Soviet protection. Surpisingly, the Soviets initially had as little interest in Castro's Cuba as Washington. However, the Cold War was on, and Kruschev was eager to project Soviet influence at the expense of Mao's communist China. And what better way to assert Soviet prestige than by establishing a Soviet communist beachhead just off America's shores.
As the US stepped up its belated and ineffectual covert operations aimed at destabilizing and eventually toppling the Castro regime, Castro sought ever more Soviet economic, and especially military, assistance. One of the Soviet's first major successes was in implementing the block surveillance program. Arms shipments became greater, more frequent, and more obvious. However, Soviet-Castro relations became endangered by one of Castro's rebellious communist lieutenants, and the Soviets were stymied by their deficiency in ICBMs. Thus, Kruschev made the fateful and audacious decision to deploy Soviet medium and intermediate range nuclear missiles and bombers in Cuba.
Much of the rest of the story is well-known. American U2 reconnaisance flights over Cuba reveal the construction of Soviet missile and bomber bases. Kennedy goes on national TV to alert the US public to the crisis and gain support for potential military action. Behind the scenes, a deal is desperately sought to end the crisis. Ultimately, Kruschev publicly agrees to remove nukes from Cuba, while Kennedy privately agrees to reciprocate in removing American missiles from Turkey.
The book reveals a great deal about how strongly individual personalities affect history and national leadership. It also demonstrates how completely inept and unrealistic the CIA's operations were in Cuba. There were a few times during Castro's rise to power that the US had a chance of courting him; however, their own ignorance of Cuba's internal politics assured they would never capitalize on it. From my standpoint, the entire crisis could have been easily avoided by resolute leadership in the White House - either make Castro an ally, oust him when he was still weak, or guarantee that Cuba will not be military threatened by the US. The fault lies with both Eisenhower and Kennedy for their weak and vacillating policies towards Castro.
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