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High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Krushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis | 
 enlarge | Author: Max Frankel
Publisher: Presidio Press
Category: Book
List Price: $15.00
Buy New: $8.50
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Rating:  2 reviews
Sales Rank: 605069
Media: Paperback
Pages: 224
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.4
Dimensions (in): 8.2 x 5.5 x 0.6
ISBN: 0345466713
Dewey Decimal Number: 327.4707309046
EAN: 9780345466716
ASIN: 0345466713
Publication Date: September 27, 2005
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Condition: Brand new and gift quality, ships immediately with delivery confirmation.
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Product Description
One of the giants of American journalism now re-creates an unforgettable time–in which the whole world feared extinction. High Noon in the Cold War captures the Cuban Missile Crisis in a new light, from inside the hearts and minds of the famous men who provoked and, in the nick of time, resolved the confrontation.
Using his personal memories of covering the conflict, and gathering evidence from recent records and new scholarship and testimony, Max Frankel corrects widely held misconceptions about the game of “nuclear chicken” played by John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev in October 1962, when Soviet missiles were secretly planted in Cuba and aimed at the United States.
High Noon in the Cold War portrays an embattled young American presidentnot jaunty and callow as widely believed, but increasingly calm and statesmanlikeand a Russian ruler who was not only a “wily old peasant” but an insecure belligerent desperate to achieve credibility. Here, too, are forgotten heroes like John McCone, the conservative Republican CIA head whose intuition made him a crucial figure in White House debates.
In detailing the disastrous miscalculations of the two superpowers (the U.S. thought the Soviets would never deploy missiles to Cuba; the Soviets thought the U.S. would have to acquiesce) and how Kennedy and Khrushchev beat back hotheads in their own councils, this fascinating book re-creates the whole story of the scariest encounter of the Cold War, as told by a master reporter.
From the Hardcover edition.
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| Customer Reviews:
The Decisionmakers' Story September 24, 2008
A. Courie (Freedom's Fortress)
Max Frankel's "High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis" is a short, readable account of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. As the name implies, Frankel focuses on the actions, decisions, and thoughts of the two major players in the crisis - President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.
Frankel was a correspondent for the New York Times and reported on the crisis at the time. He had also been posted to Moscow and had many acquaintances in the Soviet government at the time. Frankel used White House recordings of the Executive Committee meetings, the correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev, and Sergei Khrushchev's (Nikita's son) memoirs, along with contemporary press accounts, as the basis of his book.
Because the book focuses on the leadership, Frankel doesn't really tell the military story, nor does he delve into the effect of the crisis on the American or Soviet people.
This is a good, short (less than 200 pages), and readable history of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Anyone hoping to get a broad overview of this episode or understand some of the diplomatic maneuvers would enjoy this book. However, this book is far from the definitive story of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
it could easily have ended badly June 30, 2006
W Boudville (Terra, Sol 3)
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
In these days of a proclaimed War on Terror, Frankel reminds us that the past was worse. In this recent recounting of the Cuban missile crisis, many of the facts are already known. But Frankel's narrative points out the myriad ways that disaster could have occurred. With mistakes in perception by both the American and Soviet leaderships.
If anything, John Kennedy's reputation is enhanced. He chose a grimly rational peace, instead of the prospects of a quick military victory in Cuba. Which may well have come about, given the American superiority in conventional forces around Cuba, but which may then have triggered a Soviet nuclear response. Curiously, too, in some ways, Khruschev also comes out of this tale well. Yes, he tried to put one over the Yankees. But ultimately, he also chose peace, even if he foresaw that it might lead to his downfall.
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